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THE TEN-YEAR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF
IMMOVABLES
One method of acquiring ownership of immovables in
Louisiana is acquisitive prescription, whereby property is acquired through continued possession over a determined
period of time fixed by law.' Allowing such a method of acquiring property promotes stability in ownership of immovables by obviating the necessity of looking indefinitely into the
past to prove ownership. 2 In Louisiana, the acquisitive prescription of ten years requires the existence of the following
3
concurrent elements:
4
(1) Good faith on the part of the possessor;
(2) A title translative of ownership; 5
(3) Possession during the requisite period of time accom6
panied by the incidents required by law;

(4)

7
An object that may be acquired by prescription.

The purpose of this comment is to give an encyclopedic overview of each of these elements of the ten-year acquisitive
prescription.
1. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3457-58, 3474-75; II AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FRAN(AIS § 210 (7th ed. Esmein) in 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 319-20 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as AUBRY & RAU]; 1 PLANIOL, TREATISE ON CIVIL LAW pt.
2, no. 2644 at 571 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as
PLANIOL].
2. AUBRY & RAU § 210 at 320; PLANIOL no. 2645 at 571.

3. As a result of All-State Credit Plan Natchitoches, Inc. v. Ratcliff, 279
So. 2d 660 (La. 1973), which overruled Trahan v. Broussard, 251 La. 714, 206
So. 2d 82 (1968), these elements of acquisitive prescription are pertinent to

the prescription of LA. R.S. 9:5682 (1950). This statute prescribes claims by
unrecognized heirs in favor of third persons who have acquired property
through an heir or legatee recognized in the judgment of possession when
the third person or his ancestor in title have been in possession for ten years.
All-State found the statute ambiguous and read it in pari materia with the
Louisiana Civil Code articles on the ten-year acquisitive prescription, concluding that good faith is necessary and that the sole effect of LA. R.S. 9:5682
is to give the judgment of possession the effect of just title for the purpose of
tacking.
4. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3474, 3479-80, 3451; Johnson, Good Faith as a
Condition of Ten Year Acquisitive Prescription,34 TUL. L. REV. 671 (1960).
5. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3474, 3479, 3483, 3486; Comment, Just Title in the
Prescriptionof Immovables, 15 TUL. L. REV. 436 (1941).
6. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3474, 3479, 3487; Comment, Elementary Considerations in the Commencement of Prescriptionof Immovable Property, 12 TUL. L.
REV. 608 (1938).
7. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3479, 3497.
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Good Faith
Since the Louisiana Civil Code articles dealing with the
ten-year acquisitive prescription do not define good faith, reference must be made to the chapter on possession." A possessor in good faith is defined in Louisiana Civil Code Article
3451 as one who has "just reason to believe himself the master
of the thing which he possesses, although he may not be in
fact. . . ."9 Bad faith, on the other hand, is possession as
owner, but with the possessor having knowledge that he has
no title or that his title is defective. 10 Thus, with regard to
acquisitive prescription, good faith results from the mistake
of the acquirer regarding the alienator's ownership, but while
the acquirer is under an honest belief based on just reason
that the person selling the property is the owner."
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that a presumption of
good faith operates in favor of a possessor, thus placing the
burden of proof on the party alleging bad faith. 2 Due to this
presumption the jurisprudence has established that a possessor is not required to inquire into the title of his vendor by
examining the public records; 3 the "purchaser will not be
charged with bad faith because a title examination, if made,
would have disclosed defects in the seller's title.' 1 4 The
reasoning behind this rule is:
8. Id. art. 3480.
9. Id. art. 3451 (emphasis added).
10. Id. art. 3452.
11. AUBRY & RAU § 218 at 363; 28 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE AND TISSIER,
TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL no. 678, 679 (4th ed. 1924) in
5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 340 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BAUDRYLACANTINERIE]; PLANIOL no. 2667 at 580.
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3481; Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 123 So. 2d 79
(1960); Harrill v. Pitts, 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940); Thibodeaux v.
Quebodeaux, 282 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Turner v. Denkman
Lumber Co., 244 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Hines v. Berlin, 28 So.
2d 613 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946); Franz v. Mohr, 4 So. 2d 584 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1941); AUBRY & RAU § 218 at 364; PLANIOL no. 2668 at 581.
13. Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 226 La. 761, 77 So. 2d
32 (1954); Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1949); Dinwiddle v.
Cox, 9 So. 2d 68, 71 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). See also Bruce v. Cheramie, 231 La.
881, 93 So. 2d 202 (1956); Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La.
175, 81 So. 2d 852 (1955); Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So. 2d
335 (1943); Land Dev. Co. v. Schulz, 169 La. 1, 124 So. 125 (1929); Holley v.
Lockett, 126 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
14. Turner v. Denkman Lumber Co., 244 So. 2d 868, 870 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 258 La. 366, 246 So. 2d 684 (1971). See also Delouche v. Rosenthal,
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If no one could invoke successfully the prescription of 10
years who could have discovered by an examination of the
public records before buying the property that the seller
had no title, the plea would never be available, because
no one could invoke it except one having a valid title and
5
having therefore no need for the prescription.'
The presumption is not rebutted by a mere showing that the
vendee has the means of obtaining knowledge of the defect in
his title. 16 However, if a title examination is instituted, the
purchaser will be "bound by what the record reveals and
cannot claim to be in good faith if the record discloses a defect
in the title of his vendor' 7 or raises doubt as to the vendor's
title., s
The determination of good faith is a factual inquiry, and
thus no particular set of facts will always be sufficient to
satisfy or rebut the good faith requirement. 9 Article 3451,
however, requires that the facts in each situation must communicate to the purchaser just reason or reasonable grounds
upon which to base his good faith, thereby creating a reasonable man standard of evaluating good faith and weakening
the presumption of good faith. 20 The inquiry, therefore, goes
beyond a possessor's moral or subjective good faith into a
determination of what is termed "legal" good faith. 21 The test
143 La. 581, 586, 78 So. 970, 972 (1918); Franz v. Mohr, 4 So. 2d 584 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1941).
15. Land Dev. Co. v. Schulz, 169 La. 1, 6, 124 So. 125, 127 (1929), quoted
approvingly in Bruce v. Cheramie, 231 La. 881, 902, 93 So. 2d 202, 209 (1957);
Keller v. Summers, 192 La. 103, 111, 187 So. 69, 71 (1939); Franz v. Mohr, 4 So.
2d 584, 587 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941).
16. Jackson v. Norred, 55 So. 2d 282, 283 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
17. Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 182, 81 So. 2d
852, 854 (1955). See also Knight v. Berwick Lumber Co., 130 La. 232, 57 So. 900
(1912); Holley v. Lockett, 126 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Dinwiddie v.
Cox, 9 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
18. See text beginning at note 21, infra.
19. Franz v. Mohr, 4 So. 2d 584, 587 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941): "The
question of good faith on the part of the person pleading the prescription of
ten years is always a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances
of the particular case." See also Harrill v. Pitts, 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940);
Thibodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 282 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Turner v.
Denkman Lumber Co., 244 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
20. Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 351, 123 So. 2d 79, 83 (1960); Tyson v.
Spearman, 190 La. 871, 895, 183 So. 201, 209 (1939).
21. See, e.g., Bel v. Manuel, 234 La. 135, 99 So. 2d 58 (1958); Thibodeaux v.
Quebodeaux, 282 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973). See generally Comment,
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for determining a possessor's "legal" good faith is whether a
man of ordinary business experience would conclude that the
22
vendor was the owner under the facts of a particular case.
Consequently, although the purchaser honestly believes he is
purchasing from the owner, knowledge of facts sufficient to
raise a doubt in a reasonably prudent person as to his vendor's title would negate his good faith. 23 The jurisprudence
provides that knowledge or notice of facts sufficient to raise
doubt in a reasonably prudent person as to the vendor's title
creates a duty to investigate. 24 Two jurisprudential rules are
operative in determining what knowledge will be attributed
to the purchaser relative to whether he is put on notice of
inquiry. First, any knowledge obtained by a possessor's at25
torney for the benefit of the possessor is imputed to him.
Secondly, as stated earlier, notice of the complete public records is also imputed to a possessor who undertakes a title
26
search.
When a possessor has notice of facts sufficient to put him
on inquiry and he fails to inform himself through an investigation, he will be held "chargeable with all the facts which by
a proper inquiry he might have ascertained. '27 The investigation required in such cases must be quite extensive, in that it
Good Faith as a Condition of Ten Year Acquisitive Prescription, 34 TUL. L.

REV. 671, 673 (1960).
22. Harrill v. Pitts, 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562, 568 (1940).
23. Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1949); Fradella v.
Pumilia, 177 La. 47, 147 So. 496 (1933); Knight v. Berwick Lumber Co., 130 La.
233, 57 So. 900 (1912); Malone v. Fowler, 228 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
24. "If a purchaser is aware of any fact which should raise doubt about
his vendor's title, he will be held under a duty to resolve that doubt .. "
Malone v. Fowler, 228 So. 2d 500, 503 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 123 So. 2d 79 (1960); Bel v. Manuel, 234 La. 135, 99 So. 2d 58
(1958); Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 226 La. 761, 77 So. 2d
32 (1954); Juneau v. Laborde, 219 La. 921, 54 So. 2d 325 (1951); Arnold v. Sun
Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1949); Thibodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 282 So. 2d
845 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); LaFleur v. Fontenot, 93 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1957).
25. Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 183, 81 So. 2d
852, 854 (1955).
26. See cases in note 17, supra.
27. Thibodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 282 So. 2d 845, 851 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
"One is not a possessor in good faith who has cause to inquire and fails to
avail himself of the meais and facilities at hand to inform himself of the true
facts ...... Blunson v. Knighton, 140 So. 302, 307 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932). See
cases cited in note 23, supra.
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necessitates that he "pursue every lead and ferret out all the
facts to the end that he may not purchase until he has complete information before him. '2 8 Notice of facts necessitating
an investigation may be "suggested by the purchaser's deed,
the records if they were searched, or the purchaser's private
knowledge. .. ;29 but the sufficiency of the facts in rebutting
the possessor's good faith must be determined on a situa30
tional basis.
Another aspect of legal good faith is the jurisprudential
rule that, regardless of his moral good faith, one who purchases under an error of law is a possessor in bad faith.3 1 This
rule is based on an interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code
Article 1846(3), which provides:
Error in law can never be alleged as the means of
acquiring, though it may be invoked as the means of
preventing loss or of recovering what has been given or
paid under such error. The error, under which a possessor
28. Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 352, 123 So. 2d 79, 83 (1960). See
Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
29. Malone v. Fowler, 228 So. 2d 500, 503 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
30. See, e.g., Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339, 123 So. 2d 79 (1960) (reference in deed to judgment of possession deemed sufficient to place possessor
on inquiry); Bel v. Manuel, 234 La. 135, 99 So. 2d 58 (1958) (doubt was
suggested by the language of the title conveying "all our undivided interests
.. "); Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 81 So. 2d 852 (1955)
(title examination by attorney disclosed facts destroying good faith of purchaser); Juneau v. Laborde, 219 La. 921, 54 So. 2d 325 (1951) (vendee's personal
knowledge of vendor's family history sufficient to raise doubt as to the validity of vendor's title); Board of Comm'rs v. Delacroix Corp., 274 So. 2d 745 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1973) (transfer of one tract with warranty while transfer of
another tract was without warranty in same deed held sufficient to raise
doubt); Malone v. Fowler, 228 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (title used
"quitclaim" type language in conveyance and purchase price was substantially below market value, possessor held not to be in good faith).
31. Thibodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 282 So. 2d 845, 851 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973)
(purchaser was well acquainted with the vendor's family, including the fact
that the vendor acquired the property while married and sold it after his
wife's death; court found purchaser in legal bad faith because his "belief that
he acquired a good title was an error of law"); Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So. 2d 68
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) (Purchaser held in legal bad faith because he knew
that his vendor, who was selling inherited property, was not an only child.
Though the purchaser knew his vendor had no living brother or sister, he
was held to the legal conclusion that there might be issue of the deceased
heirs, entitled to ownership by law.). See also Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La.
50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1949); Holley v. Lockett, 126 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961); Lafleur v. Fontenot, 93 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
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may be as to the legality [illegality] of his title, shall not
give him a right to prescribe under it.
Because Article 1846 is contained in Title IV of the Louisiana
Civil Code, dealing with conventional obligations, its application to the articles of the Code dealing with good faith as a
requirement for the ten-year acquisitive prescription has
been criticized as an extension of Article 1846 beyond its
proper sphere. 32 Critics argue that Article 1846 relates only to
the contractual relations between the parties to prevent a
purchaser from acquiring prescriptive title from his vendor
33
by error of law and does not apply as to third persons.
The good faith of a possessor must exist only at the moment his possession is commenced; his subsequent bad faith
arising during his possession will not defeat or interrupt prescription. 34 Because a claim based on the ten-year acquisitive
prescription arises long after possession is commenced, it is
necessary not to overlook the fact that the question of good
faith is appraised in relation to whether the purchaser should
have doubted his vendor's title from the facts he knew at the
5
time the possession was commenced. 3
Just Title
The Louisiana Civil Code defines "just title" as "a legal
and transferable title of ownership. ' '36 Just title does not
mean only that which is derived from the true owner, "for
then no true prescription would be necessary, but a title
which the possessor may have received from any person
whom he honestly believed to be the real owner, provided the
title were such as to transfer the ownership of the prop32. The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor the 1973-1974 TermPrescription,35 LA. L. REV. 329, 331 (1974); Note, 28 LA. L. REV. 662 (1968).
33. See law review articles cited in note 32, supra.
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3482; AUBRY & RAU

§ 218 at 365; BAUDRY-

LACANTINERIE no. 685 at 343; PLANIOL no. 2669 at 581. If prescription commences in good faith, the right to prescriptive title will not be affected by the
fact that the property is afterwards held in subjective bad faith resulting
from knowledge obtained by a subsequent title search or otherwise. Ryan v.
Ribbeck, 228 La. 624, 83 So. 2d 650 (1955); Goree v. Sanders, 203 La. 859, 14 So.
2d 744 (1943); Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So. 2d 335
(1943); Davis v. Bradford, 113 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959); Hines v. Berlin,
28 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
35. Malone v. Fowler, 228 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3483.
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erty. ' 37 The phrase "transfer the ownership of the property"
does not refer to a title which in fact transfers the ownership,
but to one "which by its nature would have been sufficient to
transfer the ownership of the property, provided it had been
derived from the real owners." 3s The Civil Code further requires that the title be valid in point of form, certain, so as to
fix exactly the origin of the possession, and proved, that is,
founded on a written instrument. 39 Thus, the requirement of
just title refers to the presence of certain legal conditions and
not to the legitimacy of the transfer of ownership, because
the very purpose of acquisitive prescription is to cure the
40
defects resulting from the transferor's lack of ownership.
Because the Louisiana Civil Code demands that a "just
title" be one translative of ownership, the following are
excluded: putative titles, that is, those existing only in the
mind of the possessor; 41 titles contingent on a suspensive
condition not yet met; 42 contracts, the purpose of which are
not to transfer ownership, such as leases, loans, or simulated
sales; 43 and acts that are declarative, thus not translative of
44
ownership, such as settlements, judgments and partitions.
37. Id. art. 3484.
38. Id. art. 3485.
39. Id. art. 3486.
40. AUBRY & RAU § 218 at 359 n.2; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE no. 655-56 at
328-29; see also Callahan v. Authement, 99 So. 2d 531, 539 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957): "Under the explanation or definition of a just title .. .the possessor,
that is, the vendee, must have acqfiired by a title purporting to convey
ownership and this title should be translative of property, which is explained
as referring to the form of the instrument such as a sale or donation. The
title on its face must be apparently valid so as to induce the possessor-vendee
to believe that it was a perfect one. Any defect in the title must be shown, so
to speak, within the four corners of the act of sale or transfer, on its face."
41. PLANIOL no. 2664 at 579; see also Comment, Just Title in the Prescription of Immovables, 15 TUL. L. REV. 436, 437 (1941).
42. However, the title will be a sufficient basis for prescription when the
condition is met. AUBRY & RAU § 218 at 362; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE no. 673
at 337.
43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3485(2); AUBRY & RAU § 218 at 260; BAUDRYLACANTINERIE no. 657 at 330. Menefee v. Pipes, 159 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 245 La. 798, 161 So. 2d 276 (1964) (Defendant based his
claim for acquisitive prescription on a warranty deed; however, defendant's
vendor continued in possession. Court held that the presumption of a simulation was not overcome and that a simulation cannot constitute just title).
44. AUBRY & RAU § 218 at 360; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE no. 664 at 333;
PLANIOL no. 2660 at 578. See, e.g., Tyson v. Spearman, 190 La. 871, 183 So. 201
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In addition, acts of transfer which upon their face 45 are absolutely null cannot serve as just title.4 6 For example, a judicial
sale ordered by a clerk without jurisdiction is an absolute
nullity, and cannot give a just title for the purpose of the
ten-year acquisitive prescription. 47 Although an absolutely
null deed cannot be considered a just title, a person holding
under such a deed may nevertheless transfer the property to
one who could acquire a valid prescriptive title if the title
under which the subsequent vendee possesses is one genuine
on its face and translative of ownership. 4 Furthermore, to
the extent that no defect is apparent on the face of acts of
(1938); Dupuis v. Broadhurst, 213 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Martin v.
Carroll, 59 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952). "But if one party ceded to the
other an immovable as a condition for the settlement, the settlement agreement could represent for the second party a just title." AUBRY & RAU § 218 at
360 n.6.
45. Jacobs v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co., 228 La. 462, 470, 82 So.
2d 765, 767 (1955); Wilkie v. Cox, 222 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 254 La. 470, 223 So. 2d 873 (1969) (even though tax sale was invalid,
deed acquired may serve as just title if it appears valid on its face and
translative of title); Callahan v. Authement, 99 So. 2d 531, 544 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1957): "[A]n absolute nullity affecting a transfer of immovable property,
but not appearing on the face of the title itself, does not prevent the running
of ten years prescription .. " Some confusion exists as to whether the defect
evidencing the nullity must appear on the face of the deed. Although the
defect was apparent on the face of the deed in Hicks v. Hughes, 223 La. 290, 65
So. 2d 603 (1953), the court did not state whether the defect must be patent on
the face of the deed to affect just title. See cases in note 48, infra. See also
Buillard v. Davis, 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936); Wilkie v. Cox, 222 So. 2d 85, 92
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3486(1); Boudreaux v. Olin Indus., 232 La. 405,
94 So. 2d 417 (1957); Hicks v. Hughes, 223 La. 290, 65 So. 2d 603 (1953);
Buillard v. Davis, 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936); Callahan v. Authement, 99 So.
2d 531 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); AUBREY & RAU § 218 at 361.
47. Hicks v. Hughes, 223 La. 290, 65 So. 2d 603 (1953); see also Buillard v.
Davis, 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936); Callahan v. Authement, 99 So. 2d 531 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1957) (Sheriff received order for seizure and sale of property of
judgment debtor, but seized and sold property of descendent of debtor instead; court held sheriff was without authority to sell when on the face of the
title he was ordered to sell only the property of the debtor. Thus the transfer
was an absolute nullity and could not serve as just title.).
48. Boudreaux v. Olin Indus., 232 La. 405, 414, 94 So. 2d 417, 419
(1957) (Plaintiffs claimed property on basis that their mother's signature
was forged on the deed and as such could not form the basis of prescription.
The court held that Hicks v. Hughes, 223 La. 290, 65 So. 2d 603 (1953), was
inapplicable because the defendant was not relying on the null deed but on a
subsequent one). See also Clayton v. Rickerson, 160 La. 771, 107 So. 569 (1926).
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judicial sales, tax and sheriff's deeds, such deeds will serve as
49
a basis for just title.
A deed cannot be considered translative of ownership unless it describes with sufficient clarity the immovable sought
to be acquired so that it may be identified, 50 because the Civil
Code requires that the title be "valid in point of form" and
that it be "certain. 5 1 Judicial rules must be developed to
determine the adequacy of the title description, because no
codal provisions set forth the requisites. Apparently, the
same rules that are applied to determine the sufficiency of a
title description between vendor and vendee apply to determine whether the description is sufficient to satisfy the just
title requirement.5 2 Because the deed must identify the property with clarity, it is not enough that the description could
be construed to include the property.5 3 The description generally must be in terms of legal subdivisions. 54 Yet the deed
need not contain a description sufficient to identify the land
without reference to other admissible extrinsic evidence to
aid in the description clarification. 55 The fact that property is
49. Jacobs v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co., 228 La. 462, 82 So. 2d
765 (1955); Eiver's Heirs v. Rankin's Heirs, 150 La. 4, 90 So. 419 (1921); Wilkie
v. Cox, 222 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 254 La. 470, 223 So. 2d
873 (1969) (tax deed valid on its face).
50. Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 226 La. 761, 775, 77
So. 2d 32, 37 (1954); Waterman v. Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 619, 35
So. 2d 225, 236 (1947); Hunter v. Forrest, 195 La. 973, 197 So. 649 (1940);
Bendernagle v. Foret, 145 La. 115, 119, 81 So. 869, 870 (1919); Albert Hanson
Lumber Co. v. Angelloz, 118 La. 861, 43 So. 529 (1907); Authement v. Theriot,
292 So. 2d 319, 326 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3486(1), (2).
52. Snelling v. Adair, 196 La. 624, 199 So. 782 (1940); Harrill v. Pitts, 194
La. 123, 136, 193 So. 562, 566 (1940).
53. Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 226 La. 761, 775, 77
So. 2d 32, 37 (1954); Waterman v. Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 619, 35
So. 2d 225, 236 (1947) (where the conveyance referred to all the land in two
townships without reference to sections or subdivisions, this type of omnibus
description was deemed inadequate).
54. Baldwin v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 185 La. 1051, 171 So.
442 (1936) (Where description was merely "[A]ll right, title and interest in and
to any and all land in Caddo and Bossier Parishes . . . " court held that
description was insufficient for purposes of just title.); J. H. Jenkins Contractors, Inc. v. Farriel, 246 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, 261 La. 374, 259 So.
2d 882 (1971).
55. "It is a settled rule of law in this state that if a portion of the
description of property in a deed is either erroneous or misleading, it is
nevertheless susceptible of conveyance if the property intended to be con-
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described as being bounded by the estate of another will
suffice to identify the property by reference to the deeds of
the bounding estates. 56 The language of some cases seems to
indicate that the reference must be to other documents in the
records, such as any map, deed, plot, patent, survey, or boundary.5 7 However, parol evidence has been allowed to aid in
clarifying an erroneous or ambiguous description, but "only
in cases where there is a sufficient body in the description to
leave the title substantially resting on writing, and not essentially on the parol. ''15 However, in cases in which a judgment
to correct an erroneous or defective title is necessary, prescription does not commence under the deed until the judg59
ment is rendered.
The Code requires a just title without reference to recordation of the deed.6 0 Lack of recordation does not affect the
sufficiency of the title as a basis for a plea of the ten-year
acquisitive prescription by the purchaser-possessor, because
6
the deed is not relied upon to convey the property. 1
veyed by the parties can be ascertained with certainty by the aid of such
extrinsic evidence as is admissible under the rules of evidence." Snelling v.
Adair, 196 La. 624, 641-42, 199 So. 782, 787 (1940); Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor,
147 La. 256, 84 So. 648 (1920). Symposium: Writing Requirements and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 35 LA. L. REV. 745, 769-71, 796-97 (1975).
56. Bruce v. Cheramie, 231 La. 881, 93 So. 2d 202 (1957); Authement v.
Theriot, 292 So. 2d 319, 326 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
57. Baldwin v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 185 La. 1051, 171 So.
442 (1936); Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor, 147 La. 256, 264, 84 So. 648, 650 (1920).
Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 284 So. 2d 608, 610-11 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974): "[T]he other 'admissible evidence' to
be referred to must be another recorded instrument such as any deed, map,
plat, patent, survey, or boundary by which the description may be ascertained. [O]ne must be able to identify and locate the property from the
description in the deed itself or from other evidence which appears in the
public records."
58. Kernan v. Baham, 45 La. Ann. 799, 810, 13 So. 155, 159 (1893). See also
Lemoine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 34 So. 2d 392 (1948); J. H. Jenkins Contractors, Inc. v. Farriel, 246 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, 261 La. 374, 259 So.
2d 882 (1971).
59. Smith v. King, 192 La. 346, 188 So. 25 (1939); Bagby v. Clause, 251 So.
2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971) (where there was a suit to correct an erroneous
description, court held that prescription commences from the date of judgment reforming the description).
60. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3478-79, 3484; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE no. 674 at
337.
61. Bernstein v. Leeper, 118 La. 1098, 43 So. 889 (1907). "[T]he right of a
purchaser to rely on the public records is qualified by the right of an adverse
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Good Faith and Just Title Distinguished
In Roman law just title evolved as an element evidencing
good faith, and was not clearly a distinct element.6 2 However,
under French law,6 and subsequently in Louisiana,64 just
title and good faith were enunciated as distinct elements.
When these elements are applied to a particular factual situation, however, some confusion of the elements occurs, because the same set of facts may be pertinent to both legal
considerations, and the Civil Code articles on just title appear
to impose both objective and subjective criteria.6 5 The subjective element of just title is arguably required by Louisiana
Civil Code Article 3484, which provides that a just title is one
which the possessor may have received from any person
whom he honestly believed to be the real owner, provided
the title were such as to transfer the ownership of the
property.6 6
However, because the requirement of just title arose originally under Roman and old French law as a condition of good
faith, only later becoming a distinct element, 67 arguably Article 3484 merely serves to emphasize that just title is distinct
from and additional to the subjective element of good faith.
This alternative reading of Article 3484, in context, does not
require a subjective belief as an incident to just title. It
merely explains that just title can be gained from one not the
owner, but goes on to restate the good faith requirement that
claimant to assert ownership acquired by prescription." Arkansas Fuel Oil
Corp. v. Weber, 149 So. 2d 101, 106 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 244 La.
205, 151 So. 2d 493 (1963). BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE no. 674 at 337; PLANIOL no.
2665 at 580. This result has been considered regrettable because, it is argued,
all interested parties should have the advantage of reference to the public
records. PLANIOL no. 2665 at 580; Comment, Just Title in the Prescriptionof
Immovables, 15 TUL. L. REV. 436 (1941).
62. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE

nos. 3, 4, 5 at 4-5; PLANIOL no. 2664 at 579.

63. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2265; AUBRY & RAU § 216 at 354-55;
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE no. 650 at 327; PLANIOL § 2659 at 578, § 2664 at 579.
64. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3474; Bel v. Manuel, 234 La. 135, 99 So. 2d 58 (1958).
65. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Prescription,32 LA. L. REV. 250, 251 (1972), wherein it it suggested
that Louisiana Civil Code Articles 3483-86 provide two elements of just title:
(1) objective, that the deed must appear to be good; and (2) subjective, that
the transferee honestly believes the transferor is the real owner.
66. Emphasis added.
67. PLANIOL no. 2664 at 579-80.

1976]

COMMENTS

1011

the purchaser must believe that he is acquiring good title. To
require subjective intent to satisfy the just title requirement
is to require the same inquiry that will necessarily accompany a good faith determination and seems to be a redundancy in analysis.
Quitclaim Deeds, Good Faith and Just Title
The problems arising in connection with quitclaim deeds
serve to highlight good faith and just title as distinct elements of acquisitive prescription.6 8 Use of a quitclaim or
non-warranty deed as a basis for the ten-year acquisitive prescription is arguably relevant to both the good faith and just
title requirements. Early cases held that a non-warranty sale
of the vendor's right, title and interest in his property disclosed a defect in the title, thus defeating the just title requirement. 69 Later cases, however, repudiated this jurisprudence and concluded that with regard to just title there was
no material difference in form between a sale of particular
property and a sale of all the vendor's right, title and interest
therein. 70 While a non-warranty deed may satisfy the just
title requirement, the failure of the vendor to warrant his
title may raise doubt in the vendee as to the title's validity.
As discussed previously, 71 notice of facts sufficient to raise
this doubt may rebut the purchaser's good faith. Because of the
quitclaim's extensive use, from a practical viewpoint the
courts have held that the quitclaim deed alone is not
sufficient notice to place the purchaser on inquiry.72 Yet when
other factors would tend to create doubt as to the validity of
the vendor's title, quitclaim deeds should be considered with
73
other evidence in resolving the issue of good faith.
68. See generally Comment, The Legal Effect of Quitclaim Deeds in
Louisiana, 23 TUL. L. REV. 533, 537 (1949).
69. E.g., Eastman v. Beiller, 3 Rob. 220 (1842); Reeves v. Towles, 10 La.
276 (1836).
70. Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So. 2d 335 (1943);
Perkins v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 171 La. 913, 132 So. 499 (1931); Perkins
v. Wisner, 171 La. 898, 132 So. 493 (1931); Read v. Hewitt, 120 La. 288, 45 So.
143 (1907).
71. See text beginning at note 21, supra.
72. Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So. 2d 335 (1943).
73. Board of Comm'rs v. Delacroix Corp., 274 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973) (conveyance of part of tract with warranty and part without warranty
sufficient to raise doubt to defeat good faith); Board of Comm'rs v. Elmer, 268
So. 2d 274 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 263 La. 613, 268 So. 2d 675
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Possession
"Possession is the detention or enjoyment of a thing,
which we hold or exercise by ourselves, or by another who
keeps or exercises it in our name. '74 Acquisitive prescription
is dependent upon possession over a prolonged period of time
as a positive basis of establishing one's relationship to the
property as owner.75 Articulating the incidents of possession
necessary to commence and support the ten-year acquisitive
'76
prescription has been a "difficulty in practical application.
The Louisiana Civil Code provides two basic requirements for
possession: "[t]he intention of possessing as owner," and
"[tihe corporeal possession of the thing. ' 77 Thus, precarious
possession, that is, possession for another, will not suffice,
since there is no intent to possess as owner.7 8 However, concerning specifically the prescription of ten years, the Code
provides additional explanation of the requisites. For example, while the thing must be held "in fact and in right as
owner," 79 a person is presumed to have possessed as owner,
unless it is apparent that his possession began for the benefit
of another. 80 Also, the prescription of ten years must be commenced by corporeal possession, but if possession is begun
corporeally, it may be continued by civil possession. 8 1 Finally,
(1972) (court considered quitclaim in conjunction with evidence of low purchase price to find that purchaser was put on inquiry that the title was defective).
74. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3426.
75. See generally PLANIOL no. 2644 at 571, no. 2649 at 573; The Work of the
LouisianaSupreme Courtfor the 1938-1939 Term-Prescription,2 LA. L. REV.
84, 86 (1939).
76. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 TermPrescription,13 LA. L. REV. 262, 264 (1953); Comment, Elementary Considerations in the Commencement of Prescriptionon Immovable Property, 12 TUL.
L. REV. 608 (1938).
77. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3436; AUBRY & RAU § 217 at 355-57; PLANIOL no.
2649 at 573.
78. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3490, 3510; AUBRY & RAU § 217 at 355; PLANIOL
no. 2649 at 573.
79. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3487(1).
80 Id. art. 3488.
81. Id. art. 3487(1); Bunn v. A. J. Hodges Indus. Inc., 279 So. 2d 268, 272 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1973); McCluskey v. Meraux & Nunez, 186 So. 117, 119 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1939). Corporeal or natural possession involves the physical detention of the thing, as by occupying a house, or cultivating the land. LA. CIV.
CODE arts. 3428, 3430. Civil possession, on the other hand, results from a
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the possession must be "continuous and uninterrupted,
peaceable, public and unequivocal. ' 8 2 Prescription is interrupted whenever the possessor acknowledges the right of
another to the title of the property. s3
The acquisitive prescription of ten years must be commenced by corporeal possession,8 4 the sufficiency of which is
essentially determined by a factual inquiry.8 5 The sufficiency
of the acts of possession depends on the character of the land.
For example, the jurisprudence recognizes that a possessor
can possess only in a manner practicable under the circumstances depending upon the nature of the land, its soil
and surroundings, and its chief value, 86 whether it be,
for example, timber 7 or marsh land. 8 However, possession
cessation of the physical possession, but without an intention to abandon the
ownership of the property. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3429, 3431.
82. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3487(2); Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Co.,
220 La. 633, 57 So. 2d 211 (1952). In Board of Comm'rs v. Elmer, 268 So. 2d 274,
280 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), the court discussed these elements saying that (1)
"[c]ontinuity of possession relates to the activities of the possessor, and
interruption of possession relates to the activities of third parties"; (2) public
possession "indicates that which is open and not clandestine. The purpose of
this requirement . .. is to inform interested persons of the possession in order
to allow them to oppose it"; (3) the question of equivocation refers to the
manner and purpose of possession, whether they appear to be as owner or
otherwise. See also AUBRY & RAU § 217 at 355-57.
83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3520; W. J. Gayle & Sons, Inc. v. Deperrodil, 300 So.
2d 599, 607 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) (the exclusion of a disputed portion of the
deed by those claiming ownership by prescription served as an acknowledgment).
84. See authority cited in note 81, supra.
85. Jacobs v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co., 228 La. 462, 82 So. 2d
765 (1955); Hill v. Richey, 221 La. 402, 59 So. 2d 434 (1952); McHugh v. Albert
Hanson Lumber Co., 129 La. 680, 56"So. 636 (1911); Bagby v. Clause, 251 So. 2d
172, 178 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Acosta v. Nunez, 5 So. 2d 574, 577 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1942).
86. Jacobs v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co., 228 La. 462, 82 So. 2d
765 (1955); Hill v. Richey, 221 La. 402, 59 So. 2d 434 (1952); Snelling v. Adair,
196 La. 624, 199 So. 782 (1940); McHugh v. Albert Hanson Lumber Co., 129 La.
680, 56 So. 636 (1911); Bagby v. Clause, 251 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
87. Boudreaux v. Olin Indus., 232 La. 405, 94 So. 2d 417 (1957) (where
land is "upland timber land" primarily used for growing timber and no other
use was ever attempted, general cutting of timber was sufficient corporeal
possession); see Bolding v. Eason Oil Co., 248 La. 269, 178 So. 2d 246 (1965);
Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So. 2d 335 (1943); Turner v.
Denkmann Lumber Co., 244 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
88. Acosta v. Nunez, 5 So. 2d 574 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) (Where property
was "low, wet marsh land," chiefly valued for trapping, such activity was
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sufficient to support a prescriptive plea must indicate clearly,
commensurate with the character of the land, that the possessor exerts control as owner over the property. 9 For example, occasional cutting of grass, 90 payment of taxes, 91 or
sporadic use for trapping, 92 standing alone, have been deemed
insufficient evidence of corporeal possession.
As a general rule, an owner in indivision cannot prescribe
against his co-owners, because possession by one co-owner is
presumed to be exercised on behalf of all co-owners.9 3 However, if a co-owner in physical possession gives notice of his
intention to possess adversely and such possession is obviously hostile, one co-owner may prescribe against the other
co-owners.9 4 When one co-owner goes into physical possession
as sole owner by means of a recorded instrument, even if
invalid, his possession is regarded as sufficiently hostile to
constitute notice to other co-owners and to rebut any presumption that he possesses for all the co-owners.9 5
Based on the applicability of Louisiana Civil Code Articommensurate with its character and therefore considered as adequate corporeal possession.).
89. E.g., Jacobs v. Southern Bag & Paper Co., 228 La. 462, 82 So. 2d 765
(1955) (cutting timber, executing oil and gas leases, and cultivation of part
was sufficient corporeal possession). Lott v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 268 So.
2d 267 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (general timber cutting and forest management
was sufficient corporeal possession); Wickie v. Cox, 222 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 254 La. 470, 223 So. 2d 873 (1969) (cruising against
trespassers, cutting timber, visible boundaries with hacks and blazes, fences
on portion, and construction of corral combined for sufficient corporeal possession).
90. Authement v. Theriot, 292 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). Cf.
Richard v. Comeaux, 260 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (possessory
action).
91. Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Co., 220 La. 633, 57 So. 2d 211
(1952); Little v. Barbe, 195 La. 1071, 1092, 198 So. 368, 375 (1940).
92. Buras v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 127 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961).
93. Alba v. Smith, 228 La. 207, 81 So. 2d 873 (1955); Arnold v. Sun Oil, 218
La. 50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1949); Hill v. Dees, 188 La. 708, 178 So. 250 (1937); Givens
v. Givens, 273 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Banks v. Yarborough, 104 So.
2d 283, 289 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
94. See cases in note 95, infra.
95. Succession of Seals, 243 La. 1056, 150 So. 2d 13 (1963); Allen v. Paggi
Bros. Oil Co., 244 So. 2d 116, 123 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 258 La.
247, 245 So. 2d 713; cf. Dupuis v. Broadhurst, 213 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1968).
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cles 343796 and 3498, 9 7 and the inapplicability of Article 350398
to the ten-year acquisitive prescription, possession of a part
of a tract or of a part of contiguous tracts is equivalent to
possession of all the land within the boundaries set forth in
the title. 9 9 This rule is inapplicable to situations when
another has adverse, corporeal possession of the land claimed
by constructive possession, because such counter possession
would amount to a dispossession of the constructive posses10 0
sor.
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3437: "It is not necessary, however, that a person
wishing to take possession of an estate should pass over every part of it; it is
sufficient if he enters on and occupies a part of the land, provided it be with
the intention of possessing all that is included within the boundaries." The
term "boundaries" means enclosures for those possessing without title and
the limits stated in the deed for those possessing under title. Leader Realty
Co. v. Taylor, 147 La. 256, 265, 84 So. 648, 650 (1920).
97. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3498: "When a person has a title and possession
conformably to it, he is presumed to possess according to the title and to the
full extent of its limits."
98. Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor, 147 La. 256, 84 So. 648 (1920); Zeringue v.
Blouin, 192 So. 2d 838, 843 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). LA. CIV. CODE art. 3503
provides: "How favorable soever prescription may be, it shall be restricted
within just limits. Thus, in the prescription of thirty years, which is acquired
without title, it extends only to that which has been actually possessed by the
person pleading it."
99. This type of possession is termed "constructive" possession. Ernest
Realty Co. v. Hunter Co., 189 La. 379, 179 So. 460 (1938). See Haas v. Dezauche, 214 La. 259, 37 So. 2d 441 (1948) (contiguous but individually described parcels held to form a single estate); Eiver's Heirs v. Rankin's Heirs,
150 La. 4, 90 So. 419 (1922); Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor, 147 La. 256, 84 So. 648
(1920); Zeringue v. Blouin, 192 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) (possession of
part rule held applicable to situation when there were three contiguous
tracts, each separately described in a single deed); Barrios v. Legendre, 127
So. 2d 790 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). See also McCluskey v. Meraux & Nunez,
186 So. 117 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939) (possession of part did not constitute
possession of whole when tracts were divided by navigable stream owned by
the state, thus making the tracts non-contiguous). But see Sessions v. Tensas
River Planting Co., 142 La. 339, 76 So. 816 (1917) (Holding that for one to
invoke the principle that possession of part with title is possession of the
whole, the part possessed must be a part of the land sought to be acquired by
prescription; based on the concept that it is necessary that the possession be
such as to put the owner on notice that another asserts ownership of his
land.).
100. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3449; Ernest Realty Co. v. Hunter Co., 189 La.
379, 179 So. 460 (1938); W. J. Gayle & Sons, Inc. v. Deperrodil, 300 So. 2d 599
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) (where there was an actual adverse corporeal possession by the tenant farmers, i.e., precarious possessors of the adverse claim-
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An additional doctrine pertinent to the possession requirement of the ten-year acquisitive prescription is the doctrine of tacking, whereby a possessor may add the possession
of his author in title to his own to fulfill the time required to
prescribe. 10 1 In order for a successor to tack his possession to
that of his author and have it applied to satisfy the ten-year
requirement, the author in title must have been in good
faith. 10 2 If the author is in bad faith and the possessor in good
faith, the possessor can prescribe only in ten years in his own
right or in thirty years with the addition of his author's
possession. 10 3 However, if the author is in good faith, the
possessor's good or bad faith is irrelevant; and if he has all
the other requirements, by tacking his possession to his author's, he can prescribe acquisitively in ten years. 1°4 This
result has been criticized, 10 5 because a successor by particular
title commences a new possession, and the commencement of
possession for purposes of acquisitive prescription should be
in good faith.
Object of Prescription
In order for an object to be a proper subject for acquisitive prescription, it must by its nature be susceptible of alienation. 10 6 In Board of Commissioners v. Elmer,10 7 it was contended that because title to the land was in the state, the
land was not an object subject to acquisitive prescription.
However, the court pointed out that the land, as immovable
ant, the possession of part could not serve as constructive possession of the
whole); Robertson v. Morgan, 116 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959); Gulf Ref.
Co. v. Jeems Bayou Hunting & Fishing Club, 129 La. 1021, 57 So. 322 (1912).
101. Barnett v. Botany Bay Lumber Co., 172 La. 205, 133 So. 446 (1931);
Devall v. Choppin, 15 La. 566 (1840); Bunn v. A. J. Hodges Industries, Inc., 279
So. 2d 268 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Liuzza v. Heirs of Nunzio, 241 So. 2d 277
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); see generally AUBRY & RAU § 218 at 365; PLANIOL no.
2677 at 585.
102. Barnett v. Botany Bay Lumber Co., 172 La. 205, 133 So. 446 (1931).
103. See comment cited in note 105, infra.
104. Devall v. Choppin, 15 La. 566 (1840); Liuzza v. Heirs of Nunzio, 241
So. 2d 277 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
105. Comment, Tacking of Possessionfor Acquisitive Prescription,8 LA.
L. REV. 105, 111 (1947).
106. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3497.
107. 268 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
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property, was by its nature susceptible of alienation within
the meaning of Article 3497. 108
Conclusion
In order for the plea of the ten-year acquisitive prescription to be sustained, the codal requisites of good faith, just
title, possession, and a prescriptive object must be satisfied.
The determination of whether these requisites are satisfied
necessarily depends on a factual inquiry by the courts in each
case. 10 9 However, underlying the decisions of the courts in
these cases is a policy which favors those who purchase and
possess in good faith, and disfavors those who belatedly assert their rights. 110
Len Kilgore
108. The real issue, as the court noted, was whether prescription runs

against the Levee Board. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3521 provides that prescription
runs against all persons except as otherwise provided by law. The issue in
Elmer was whether the exception established in favor of the State under La.
Const. art. XIX, § 16 (1921), was applicable to the Levee Board. See Board of
Comm'rs v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929).
109. Two recent cases affecting the procedure for pleading the ten-year
acquisitive prescription are Montgomery v. Breaux, 297 So. 2d 185 (La. 1974),
and Ledoux v. Waterbury, 292 So. 2d 485 (La. 1974). In Montgomery, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that acquisitive prescription can be pleaded
as a peremptory exception under LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 927, in which case all
that will be considered is whether the sufficient period of time under the
applicable codal provision has run. The court in Ledoux held that the tenyear acquisitive prescription could be pleaded in boundary actions, because
as the official revision comment to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
explains, questions of title can be determined in actions on boundary, including prescriptive title.
110. Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So. 2d 335 (1943);

Allen v. Paggi Bros. Oil Co., 244 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied 258
La. 247, 245 So. 2d 716 (1921); Jackson v. Norred, 55 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1951); Hines v. Berlin, 28 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946); cf. Lafitte,
Dufilho, and Co. v. Godchaux, 35 La. Ann. 1161 (1883).

